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Evaluation of Sporting Success in Austria – 
An Institutional Economics Analysis 
 
by 
Michael Barth, Eike Emrich, and erank Daumann 
 
 
Abstract: In analysis of Austrian elite sport, a distinction can be made between hier-
archical and market organization. eollowing Williamson, the question of a superior-
ity of governance form caused by the factor specificity of investments is being in-
vestigated. The results from an applied logit-loglinear model on data from survey 
with Austrian ‘squad-athletes’ show that apparently there exists no such superiority. 
eurther investigation of data shows that these results appear to be caused by Aus-
tria’s “pre-conditions”. In a hybrid form of organization like in Austria centraliza-
tion might have exceeded the optimal extend and congruency of different products 
seem to be overemphasized. (JEL: D230, Z280) 
 
 
Keywords: New Institutional Economics, asset specificity, factor specificity of in-
vestments, sports promotion, sport governance 
 4 
Evaluation of Sporting Success in Austria – 
An Institutional Economics Analysis 
 
by 
Michael Barth, Eike Emrich, and erank Daumann 
1. Introduction 
Emrich et al. (cf. Emrich, Klein, Pitsch, and Pierdzioch, 2012, 2013; elatau and Em-
rich, 2013; Pierdzioch and Emrich, 2013) developed a model to measure national 
Olympic success by medal counts that applies to open societies only. Open societies 
are defined by the presence of a high degree of political and civil liberty rights.1 The 
model developed explains (following Occam's Razor) as much as possible the cross-
country variance of success at Olympic Games by using only a small number of ex-
planatory variables. Emrich et al. (2012) have shown that population size and eco-
nomic prosperity are the most important factors influencing medals totals.2 Eco-
nomic prosperity is shown to be more important for Winter Olympic Games; popu-
lation size more important for Summer Olympic Games.  
Although the variables used by Emrich et al. (2012) are not the only variables that 
help to explain sporting success, they can explain a substantial proportion of the 
cross-country variability of sporting success among open societies. The explanatory 
power of the regression equations used is higher for Summer Olympics (R²adj. be-
tween .470 and .723) than for Winter Olympics (R²adj. between .284 and .489; for 
Winter 1998 not calculable). Emrich et al. (2012) suggest that other (unobserved) 
factors are important for explaining sporting success in Winter Olympics (for exam-
ple geographical conditions and climate). A second explanation they consider is that 
the strong influence of GDP per capita reflects a strong dependence on specific and 
costly sports facilities for Winter Games (elatau and Emrich, 2013). However, a 
wide range of variance remains to be explained, and also why some nations overful-
fill the expectations of the model while others don’t.  
In general, open societies attempt to promote high performance sporting elites by 
using similar means and different institutional structures and promotional programs. 
Institutional structures of sports promotion can be located between an often decen-
tralized laissez-faire system and an often centralized rigid system. The first one 
commonly develops in open, democratic societies, the second one often tends to be 
enforced by a rigid, dirigiste and centrally-planned system of sports promotion.3  
                                                 
1 Countries were defined as open societies if they showed the two highest levels of civil liberties 
during a period of four years including an Olympic year (Emrich et al., 2012). 
2 This result is confirmed for Summer Olympics by the study of Leeds and Leeds (2012). The 
mentioned authors further estimated separated models for men and women and came to the conclu-
sion “that the determinants of success by a nation’s women closely resemble the determinants for its 
men” (Leeds and Leeds, 2012, p. 279). 
3 Pierdzioch, Emrich, and Klein (2014) show the limited power of conventional determinants 
(population size and economic resources) in explaining medal counts since 1970 in the case of The 
German Democratic Republic (GDR). They argue that the socialist dictatorship undertook “massive 
investments in doping in elite sports to stabilize and promote citizens' loyalty in the wake of an accel-
erating economic depression” (Pierdzioch et al. 2014, p. 23). After developing a model of an optimiz-
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erom an economic perspective, the result of promoting elite sports can be measured 
via sporting success in the form of medals. The efficiency of organization is there-
fore the most important key factor to enhance sporting success. Here we apply the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) to the analysis of the production of elite athletic 
success. NIE analyses institutions of governance suitable to optimize the efficiency 
of transactions (Williamson, 1991). We focus on a central concept from transaction 
cost economics, namely the dependency of the outcome of sport supporting systems 
upon the optimal governance structure. 
It is necessary to consider asset specificities for the production of sporting success in 
Austria. To analyze the effectiveness4 of the sports promotion system, depending on 
the different asset specificities of diverse sports, we compare the success of Austrian 
elite athletes in sports characterized by varying levels of different asset specificities.  
The paper is structured as follows: eirst the NIE and its applications to economic 
research in sports are discussed (including theoretical considerations of both mean-
ing and role of institutions and the concept of asset specificities with special refer-
ence to talent promotion and talent identification) (Section 2). Then the organiza-
tional nature of Austria’s sporting promotion system is described shortly. (Section 
3).5 Thirdly a different sports are categorized by means of their asset specificities, 
and a description of the methods used in our empirical study is done (Section 4). The 
results section follows next (Section 5), with a subsequent discussion of these 
aforementioned results (Section 6). The paper ends with our conclusions (Section 7). 
 
2. NIE and Its Application to Economic Research in Sports 
According to Simon (1985, p. 303) nothing is more fundamental in the field of eco-
nomic research than “our view of the nature of the human beings whose behavior we 
are studying”. On the subject of economics of governance, cognition and self-
interestedness are especially relevant (Williamson, 2005). Both the occurrence of an 
asymmetrical distribution of information between the principal and the agent in eco-
nomic models, as well as the modeling of the individual as a utility maximizing, 
bounded rational person possessing the willingness to act opportunistically (in prin-
ciple) are main characteristics of the NIE (Welge and Eulerich, 2014). 
The NIE cannot be described as a cohesive theory. It consists of several theoretical 
approaches. A distinction between the following three related and overlapping theo-
retical components can often be found: (1) property-rights theory, (2) transaction 
costs economics and (3) the principal-agent theory. The first, as its name suggests, 
deals with the arrangement and distribution of property-rights (usus, abusus and 
fructus). The second installs the distribution of property rights as a framework con-
                                                                                                                                         
ing dictatorship they show that a rational dictatorship increases investments in elite sports and doping 
in such a way “that the marginal utility from such investments equals the marginal utility from spend-
ing economic resources [sic!] on political repression” (Pierdzioch et al. 2014, p. 23). The empirical 
results are in line with the predictions of the model. 
4 Although an analysis of efficiency (i.e. the consideration of public costs) would be desirable, the 
lack of appropriate data prohibit its realization. 
5 The considerations of section 3 are based on a comprehensive analysis of Barth (2015). 
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dition and attends to the question which forms of trans-actions can be organized and 
settled most efficiently under which kind of institutional arrangements. The third 
theoretical approach deals particularly with questions within the context of the oc-
currence of motivational problems arising out of the asymmetrical distribution of 
information and the principle willingness of the individual to act opportunistically 
(Welge and Eulerich, 2014). 
Although eranck (1995) “theorized about management strategies in the team sport 
industry using the theory of property rights, the principal-agent model, transaction 
cost and institutional economics” (Andreff and Szymanski, 2009, p. 4) more than 20 
years ago, NIE seems to be still rarely used in sports related research until today.6 
Nevertheless, several contributions dealing with sports related research questions 
and using the components of NIE as a theoretical framework can be found, espe-
cially in the recent past. Table 1 shows an overview of contributions illustrating the 
relevance of NIE-related research. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Even five years earlier Horch (1990) used the Institutional Choice approach to discuss malfunc-
tions of (sport) associations and showed a comparison of transaction costs between businesses and 
voluntary organizations. 
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Table 1. Overview of Contributions of Upcoming NIE-related Research in Sports Economics 
Author(s) Topic 
Geographical 
origin of data 
used 
Team sports industry/league or individual 
sports (further description) 
Sports 
Scully (1974)7 Reserve Clause and its consequence for players US 
Team sports industry/league (Major League 
Baseball (MLB)) 
Baseball 
eernie and 
Metcalf (1999) 
Shirking Europe Individual sports (British Horse racing) 
Horseracing 
(Jockeys) 
Marburger 
(2002) 
Property Rights and player transfer 
 
US Team sports industry/league (MLB) Baseball 
Maxcy, eort, 
and Krautmann 
(2002) 
Shirking US Team sports industry/league (MLB) Baseball 
eeess and 
Muehlheusser 
(2003) 
Analyzation of possible impacts of three different transfer fee sys-
tems in European soccer; theoretical only 
No data 
Team sports industry/league (European pro-
fessional soccer leagues) 
Soccer 
earrelly and 
Quester (2003) 
Principal-agent relationship and sponsorship Australia 
Team sports industry/league (Australian 
eootball League) 
eootball 
Marburger 
(2003) 
Assignment of Property Rights and shirking US Team sports industry/league (MLB) Baseball 
Mason and 
Slack (2003) 
Principal-agent relationships in professional hockey 
No informa-
tion 
Team sports industry/league (professional 
hockey, no further information) 
Ice hockey 
Easton and 
Rockerbie 
(2005) 
Consequences of introducing a new rule (rule 89) US 
Team sports industry/league (National 
Hockey League) 
Ice hockey 
                                                 
7 Scully’s model was expanded by Sommers and Quinton (1982) (rescinded reserve clause, MLB), and Scott Jr., Long, and Somppi (1985) (player salaries in 
NBA). 
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Sam, Batty, and 
Dean (2005) 
Transaction costs and sport sponsorship; theoretical considerations 
only 
No data No information No information 
Berri and 
Krautmann 
(2006) 
Long-term contracts and shirking US 
Team sports industry/league (National Bas-
ketball League (NBA)) 
Basketball 
Sanderson and 
Siegfried (2006) 
Reconsideration of Rottenberg’s famous article “The Baseball Play-
ers’ Labor Market” with special attention to competitive balance, 
constraints on payroll and freedoms to contract, revenue sharing, 
territorial rights, and the supply of talent; theoretical considerations 
only 
No data Team sports industry/league (MLB) Baseball 
Stiroh (2007) Contract-related incentive effects on individual performance US Team sports industry/league (NBA) Basketball 
Dietl, eranck, 
Hasan, and 
Lang (2009) 
Comparative institutional analysis of cooperative form of organiza-
tion of professional sports league versus contractual governance; 
theoretical only 
No data 
Team sports industry/league (European pro-
fessional soccer leagues) 
Soccer 
Krautmann and 
Donley (2009) 
Shirking US Team sports industry/league (MLB) Baseball 
elatau and Em-
rich (2011) 
Die Organisation sportlichen Erfolges: Zur erage nach Markt oder 
Hierarchie im Spitzensport am Beispiel der Eliteschulen des Sports 
Europe Individual sports Different sports 
erick (2011) Shirking Europe 
Team sports industry/league (German 
Bundesliga) 
Soccer 
Dietl, eranck, 
Lang, and 
Rathke (2012) 
Possible consequences of introducing a salary cap in European soc-
cer leagues; theoretical considerations only 
No data 
Team sports industry/league (European pro-
fessional soccer leagues) 
Soccer 
elatau and Em-
rich (2013) 
Transaction costs and elite sports promotion Europe Individual sports Different sports 
Lee (2014) 
Optimal contract design for baseball players (principal-agent the-
ory); theoretical considerations only 
No data Team sports industry/league Baseball 
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White and Shel-
don (2014) 
External and internal motivation theory and performance8 US Team sports industry/league (MLB, NBA) 
Baseball, Bas-
ketball 
Buraimo, erick, 
Hickfang, and 
Simmons (2015) 
Long-term contracts, shirking (moral hazard) and selection effects  Europe 
Team sports industry/league (German 
Bundesliga) 
Soccer 
Berri and 
Krautmann 
(2006) 
Contracts as rent-seeking devices Europe 
Team sports industry/league (German 
Bundesliga) 
Soccer 
Sanderson and 
Siegfried (2006) 
Examine the consequences of explicit and implicit performance 
incentives in a competitive labor market with no internal promotion 
opportunities 
US 
Team sports industry/league (National Colle-
giate Athletic Association) 
eootball 
(coaches) 
Stiroh (2007) 
Investigating the question which actors and instruments define EU 
control of eIeA and UEeA an the theoretical basis of the principal-
agent theory9; theoretical considerations only 
No data International eederations (eIeA, UEeA) 
Soccer (govern-
ing bodies) 
                                                 
8 Interestingly the authors did not refer to the principal-agent theory as such, but reconsidering external and internal motivation theory, self-determination 
theory and the core of the principal-agent theory clearly shows their close relationships and the value of motivational theories for a further development of the 
NIE, whereas sports data can supply valuable datasets for empirical testing.  
9 A similar investigation was done by Geeraert (2016) when he attended to the question on the theoretical foundation of the principal-agent theory which 
(potential) role in sports governance the EU might play. 
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This review is clearly limited, nevertheless it shows some interesting insights:  
[1] The main part of the research is empirical (72%). 
[2] erom this empirical research, 56% of studies are based on analyzing data from 
the US, 33% from Europe, one contribution is based on the examination of 
data from Australia and in one case it was not possible to clarify this question 
due to missing information. 
[3] The great majority (84%) of research is limited to the team sports industry, 
whereas 
[4] data from the MLB are most commonly used. 
[5] With the exception of three studies, all deal with one sport only.  
[6] Looking at the investigated sports more closely, the conclusion can be drawn 
that baseball (8 times) and soccer (7 times) are the most frequently analyzed 
sports. 
[7] Baseball is restricted to the US market. In case of soccer, several contribu-
tions are (only) theoretical in their nature and refer to European professional 
soccer leagues. If the soccer studies are empirical, the data used originate 
from the European market. 
 
Besides these original articles, Garner, Humphrey, and Simkins (2016) recently 
gave an overview to the compensation literature in finance and sports. Several of 
the articles analyzed in this review used one of the three approaches mentioned 
further above of NIE as theoretical framework. With the results of this short 
analysis it becomes apparent that there still exists a lack of studies using the valu-
able frameworks of NIE, especially when it comes to individual sports in Euro-
pean countries.  
A closer look at the specific problem being addressed in this paper – the produc-
tion/organization of sporting success – reveals that although the efforts in talent 
identification and talent promotion originate from the field, the question how to 
effectively organize the production of sporting success aroused much scientific 
interest in recent decades (Vaeyens, Güllich, Warr, and Philippaerts, 2009). Stud-
ies showed that in sports used instruments are not effective for the goal of reach-
ing international sporting success at elite level (e.g., Barth, 2015; Emrich and Gül-
lich, 2005). Consequently, several (new) models]) of talent development have 
been proposed (e.g., the differentiated model of giftedness and talent 2.0 by 
Gagné (2010). eurthermore, several reviews have been done on the topic of talent 
selection and talent promotion (see e.g., Vaeyens et al., 2009; on racquet sport see 
eaber, Bustin, Oosterveld, Elferink-Gremser, and Nijhuis-Van der Sanden, 2016; 
on soccer see Unnithan, White, Georgiou, Iga, and Drust, 2012). The fact, that a 
huge number of studies on the organization of sporting success exist, but many of 
them remain on a descriptive level appears to be problematic, because the ques-
tion of effectiveness might be addressed, but the empirical proof/investigation of 
success is not part of these studies (e.g., Digel, Burk, and eahrner, 2006). 
Despite these great efforts economical approaches still appear to be underrepre-
sented. Considering that the production of sporting success is done within a com-
plex system – encompassing several principal-agent relations and sport governing 
bodies functioning as monopoly – by “using” sports differing not only in their 
requirement of resources or their necessity in investments but also being charac-
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terized by dissimilar transaction specificities, one can easily see the potential of 
analyzing the various existing problems by applying economical frameworks, 
especially those of the NIE.10 Concerning the above mentioned subject of this pa-
per it has to be concluded that only two papers (elatau and Emrich, 2011, 2013) 
addressed the issue of superiority of one governance form over another caused by 
the factor specificity of investments.  
Therefore, this article places the transaction costs economics at the center of inter-
est. Due to that fact the question immediately arises as to what characteristic fea-
tures transactions can be differentiated. eor Williamson (1979, p. 239) “the three 
critical dimensions for characterizing transactions are (1) uncertainty, (2) the fre-
quency with which transactions recur, and (3) the degree to which durable trans-
action-specific investments are incurred.” “Uncertainty is the source of distur-
bances to which adaptation is required” (Williamson, 2005, p. 7) and the second 
mentioned quality concerns on one hand setup costs on the other hand reputation 
effects. The third can be used to compare the two generic forms of organization – 
market and hierarchy – with regard to their transaction costs. In principle, it can 
be said that the utility of vertical integration for ongoing transaction rises with the 
(increasing) factor specificities of investment (see basically i.e. Williamson, 1975, 
1979, 1981, 2005). This factor specificities of investments are the higher the 
lesser degrees of freedom concerning certain factors of production are. Those are 
as follows: the location of production, the factual and human capital used, the 
numbers of customers and their extent of purchase as well as the reputation 
(elatau and Emrich, 2011). Putting these considerations in the context of the pro-
duction of sporting success, the question arises whether the proportion of effi-
ciency of different institutional arrangements (and therefore forms of organiza-
tion) are influenced by the above mentioned factors. 
 
3. The High Performance Sport Supporting System in Austria and the 
Question of “Good Governance” 
The organization of the Austrian high performance sport system can be described 
as a production network (Barth, 2015) with an (assumed) long-lasting process of 
product preparation in sports clubs and submit to a high amount of uncertainty. 
The organization of the production network leads to two main propositions. 
eirstly, our methodological foundation is based on the methodological individual-
ism11  and we theoretically do not conceive the production network as being a sin-
gle actor. Secondly, Austria’s sport system is characterized by a high amount of 
autonomy within the national sport governing bodies, in the context of how deci-
                                                 
10 eor example, several articles analyze the discrepancy between coaching behavior and how 
they should behave on basis of scientific evidence (e.g., Cushion, eord, and Williamson, 2012). 
Most of these articles’ explanations are basically missing reflection and therefore a problem of 
information – the fact that this could also be a motivational problem (principal-agent theory) is 
rarely addressed. 
11 This does not mean that we refute sociostructurally explanations to purposes of actions 
(Tacke, 2006). 
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sions about the way in which sports promotion should be carried out are made.12 
Being responsible for developing their sports, the different national sport govern-
ing bodies (NSGBs) can be seen as the central organization for all questions con-
cerning the promotion of their specific sport(s). Such a production network com-
posed of at least partially independent subunits (Barth, 2015) requires a high level 
of coordinating mechanisms. The subsidies to pay the sports promotion mostly 
come from the government, thereby limiting autonomy. 13 Principally the sports 
promotion system could be organized in different forms which should lie any-
where in between market and hierarchy. 
In the light of Williamson’s third attribute characterizing a transaction – the incur-
rence of durable transaction-specific investments – the question of a superiority of 
one governance form over another (here: market vs. hierarchy) caused by the fac-
tor specificity of investments will be investigated. Comparing the two forms of 
organization it is expected that results will show the hierarchical form to be more 
(relatively) favorable in the case of sports with a high degree of dependency upon 
the location of production/high degree of site specificity and/or a high degree of 
dependency upon the factual capital/physical asset specificity (Sportshigh) in com-
parison to sports which are determined by only a low degree of dependency upon 
the location of production and the factual capital (Sportslow). 
In using this theoretical approach for analysis the following restrictions have to be 
made: eirstly, although the analysis of efficiency, meaning the relationship be-
tween caused public costs and success (i.e. Olympic medals) would be desirable, 
the lack of appropriate data prohibit its realization. The question to investigate is 
under which conditions a more hierarchical form of production is more or less 
effective. Addressing effectiveness, but not efficiency, seems to be justified if the 
annotations that transaction costs mainly occur in the form of mal-adaptation are 
considered (Williamson, 2005). Secondly, factor specificity of investment is lim-
ited in this article to the above mentioned variables.  
To make a comparison regarding the effectiveness of the two generic forms of 
organization, a third restriction has to be introduced: The analysis will be done 
only for a certain form of governmental-hierarchical promotion of sporting suc-
cess – the elite schools of sports (ESS) in Austria. These schools should make a 
positive contribution to the development of sporting talents, meaning that athletes 
who attend an ESS should be more successful than athletes who do not attend 
such a school.  
eourthly, only two forms of governance (market: production via sports clubs 
without athletes’ attendance to an ESS; hierarchy: production with athletes attend-
ing an ESS) are considered. 
The main goal of the production network of sporting success is the maximization 
of a nation’s sporting success in elite classes within international competitions 
(i.e. by an increasing number of Olympic medals). So the ESS should contribute 
to this main goal. Sporting success is measured on the collective level, whereas 
                                                 
12 This seems to be true not only in comparison to nations with less liberal political systems, 
but also for politically comparable nations like Germany. 
13 Since 2009 the federal minister of the responsible ministry has changed three times, every 
one of them emphasizing the need to reform the promotion system. 
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the examination will be done on the individual level by analyzing the extent to 
which pupils of ESS are more successful in sports than athletes who are not pupils 
of ESS. This possibly might not be a valid equalization of (probably) two different 
forms of rationality (Barth, 2015; Emrich and Güllich, 2005). 
Up until today early success in age restricted competition classes is used in insti-
tutionalized regulatory instruments of different institutions in (Austria’s) (high 
performance) sports system as a criterion for supporting athletes by the promoting 
system and are often considered as valid prognostic variables for future sporting 
success (Barth 2015), in spite of the fact that several empirical contributions speak 
against its prognostic validity. 
erom the above the following hypothesis can be deduced: 
H1: The positive correlation between the attendance to an ESS and the sporting 
success in the competition age class “elite” is higher in Sportshigh compared to 
Sportslow 
H2: The positive correlation between the attendance to an ESS and the sporting 
success in the competition age class “junior” is higher in Sportshigh compared to 
Sportslow. 
 
4. Methods 
We provided a questionnaire covering more than 100 questions in which Austrian 
‘squad-athletes’ were questioned (among other things) on their ‘sportive life 
course’ and socio-demographic characteristics. 31 out of the sample of 33 NSGB 
– each of them part of the Olympic program – declared their support for this 
study14, but the posting observing data protection had to be made, with one excep-
tion, via the NSGBs. The period of survey was between August and September 
2008. The response rate was about 20 % and after quality control, 340 question-
naires could be analyzed.15 The sample was constrained to athletes who had al-
ready reached the age limit of juniors according to the international competition 
rules of their sports (n = 291). Another introduced restriction was that only athletes 
of individual sports were included in the sample to be analyzed (n = 201) (compare 
elatau and Emrich, 2011). 
We wanted to test for representativeness of the sample concerning the two vari-
ables level of squad and sports-groups.16 But since the determination of the num-
ber of athletes in every squad had to be done via a third person, with missing lists 
of squads and the forwarding of the questionnaire via the NSGBs in most of the 
cases, it was not possible to determine the basic population on the level of differ-
entiation that we needed.17 
                                                 
14 Not included in the study: ‘Österreichischer Eisschnelllauf Verband’ and ‘Austrian Sport-
schützen eachverband’. 
15 eor a detailed description of the methods, see (Barth, 2015). 
16 The arrangement of groups was done according to Güllich (2007). eor the exact allocation of 
sports to the groups see Barth (2015).  
17 Another problem was that in Austria every NSGB dispenses its own cadre system with the 
consequence that in contrast to the situations in other nations like Germany, the squads of different 
sports are hardly comparable. 
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On the basis of the classification of elatau and Emrich (2011) concerning the de-
gree of dependency upon physical asset specificity and upon site specificity the 
sample can be described as follows: 
 
Table 2. Description of Sample on Basis of Classifying Sports Concerning Their 
Degree of Dependency upon Physical Asset Specificity and upon Site Specificity 
Physical asset specificity  Site specificity 
High n Low n  High n Low n 
Alpine skiing 14 Badminton 6 
 Alpine Ski-
ing 
14 Athletics 21 
Athletics 21 
Beach vol-
leyball 
4 
 
Biathlon 3 Badminton 6 
Biathlon 3 Boxing 3 
 
Bobsled 8 
Beach vol-
leyball 
4 
Bobsled 8 Curling 4  Canoe 5 Boxing 3 
Canoe 5 Cycling 25 
 Cross-
country Ski-
ing 
2 Curling 4 
Cross-
country ski-
ing 
2 Gymnastics 4 
 ereestyle-
skiing (Mo-
guls) 
1 Cycling 25 
Equestrian 6 Judo 4 
 Nordic com-
bined 
3 Equestrian 6 
eencing 3 
Rhythmical 
gymnastics 
3 
 
Rowing 10 eencing 3 
ereestyle-
skiing (mo-
guls) 
1 Shooting 21 
 
Rhythmical 
gymnastics 
3 Gymnastics 4 
Modern 
pentathlon 
1 Swimming 3 
 
Shooting 21 Judo 4 
Nordic com-
bined 
3 Table tennis 5 
 
Skeleton 1 
Modern 
pentathlon 
1 
Rowing 10 Taekwondo 6  Ski cross 1 Table tennis 5 
Skeleton 1 Wrestling 4  Ski jumping 6 Taekwondo 6 
Ski cross 1     Snowboard 7 Tennis 5 
Ski jumping 6     Swimming 3    
Snowboard 7     Trampoline 3    
Tennis 5     Triathlon 9    
Trampoline 3     Wrestling 4    
Triathlon 9           
Total 109 Total 92  Total 104 Total 97 
 
eor the final classification of sports, we used a dichotomy dummy. Sportshigh are 
those sports which are classified as being highly dependent on physical asset 
specificity and/or site specificity. Sportslow are those sports assessed as having a 
low degree of dependency upon physical asset specificity and upon site specificity 
(marked bold in table 2). 
To test the above mentioned hypothesis we have to statistically test for interde-
pendence between three variables – for H1 between ESS attendance (dichotomy), 
sports classification (dichotomy) and success at international competitions on elite 
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level (dichotomy), for H2 between ESS attendance (dichotomy), sports classifica-
tion (dichotomy) and success at international competitions on junior level (dichot-
omy). 
If an athlete is to classify as successful (on junior and/or elite level) or not was 
judged on behalf of the following criteria:18 
 
Table 3. Success Assessment 
Competition classes operationalization of international success 
Juniors 
Medals at Junior European Championships or World 
Championships 
Tops 
Medals at European Championships, at World Cham-
pionships, at Olympic Games 
 
To test for the hypothesis, we used a saturated logit-loglinear model. eurthermore, χ²-tests (includ-
ing Yates-correction for n < 60), Cramer’s-V, and, because of not given normal distribution in the 
sub-subsamples (KS-test: p < .05), Mann-Whitney-U-Test was applied 
All tests carried out were two-sided, with a 5 % level of significance. The software used was IBM 
SPSS Statistics 23. 
 
5. Results 
The descriptive results of testing for H1 are shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Elite Success 
 
ESS 
attendance 
Successful 
Not success-
ful 
Relative suc-
cess 
Proportion of 
relative suc-
cess 
Yes 31 35 47 % 
Sportshigh 
No 39 50 44 % 
1.1 
Yes 0 20 0 % 
Sportslow 
No 0 24 0 % 
1.0 
 
Interestingly there is no single athlete practicing Sportslow who can be classified as successful at 
elite level. The descriptive results show that the proportion of relative success both lie near 1. This 
not only means that H1 cannot be rejected (λ = .0127 (7380.887), z = .000, p = 1.000, n = 199), but 
also shows that neither for Sportshigh (χ² = .152, df = 1, p = .697, n = 155) nor Sportslow a superiority 
of one governance form over another seem to exist. 
The same seems to be true for success at junior level (λ = 1.227 (1.546), z = .794, p = .427, n = 145). 
 
                                                 
18 The formulation and calculation of the success parameters was made according to Güllich 
(2007), which would allow to treat the success variables as metric. On behalf of the relative low 
numbers of athletes, although the study was done as a comprehensive survey, we decided to use 
dichotomy success variables.  
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Table 5. Distribution of Junior Success 
 
ESS 
attendance 
Successful 
Not success-
ful 
Relative suc-
cess 
Proportion of 
relative suc-
cess 
Yes 24 27 47 % 
Sportshigh 
No 8 58 12 % 
3.8 
Yes 1 9 10 % 
Sportslow 
No 1 17 6 % 
1.8 
 
Again there exists the problem that only a very small number (n = 2) of athletes 
practicing Sportslow can be classified as successful. If the χ²-analysis is again re-
stricted to Sportshigh the hypothesis of independence has to be rejected 
(χ² = 17.673, df = 1, p = .000, n = 117). The results show that athletes of ESS are 
relatively more successful at junior level than those athletes not attending such a 
school, but this “advance” seems to diminish for success at elite level (at collec-
tive level). The correlation found can be described as moderately (Cramer’s-
V=.389). 
Interestingly the results show that there seems to exist a positive correlation be-
tween success at junior and elite level, meaning that athletes being successful at 
junior level are more likely to become a successful elite athlete (χ² = .881, df = 1, 
p = .003, n = 118). 
 
Table 6. Correlation of Success in Sportshigh 
  Elite level  
  Successful Not successful Total 
Successful 24 8 32 Junior 
level Not successful 38 48 86 
 Total 62 56 118 
 
However, it has to be mentioned that the found correlation has to be described as 
weak to moderately (Cramer’s-V = .274). 
This means that for Sportshigh ESS attendance increases moderately the probability 
to reach success at junior level and this success is weakly to moderately positive 
correlated with elite success, but the latter is not correlated with ESS attendance. 
The data of the group of elite successful athletes were further analyzed, bringing 
forward interesting results. Table 7 shows that more than half of elite level inter-
national successful athletes in Sportshigh who attended an ESS were successful at 
junior level. On the contrary, only 19 % of elite level international successful ath-
letes in Sportshigh not attending an ESS were successful at junior level.  
 
Table 7. Distribution of Elite Level International Successful Athletes in Sportshigh 
  Elite level  
  Successful Not successful Total 
Successful 18 6 24 Junior 
level Not successful 12 25 37 
 Total 30 31 61 
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This means that internationally successful athletes at elite level competitions in 
Sportshigh seem to use two different pathways. eirst the “early career athletes” who 
are attending an ESS and having international success at junior level, the latter not 
significantly but at least by trend differentiating them from the less successful 
elite athletes (χ² (Yates corrected) = 3.717, df = 1, p =.054, n = 51; 60 % successful 
at junior level). Second the “later career athletes”, without attendance to ESS and 
no junior level success, the latter not differentiating them from their less success-
ful elite counterparts (χ² = 2.872, df = 1, p =.09, n = 66; 19 % successful at junior 
level). The labelling was chosen because the two groups sig. differ in the athletes’ 
age when starting training in their sports in sports clubs (MdnESS = 9.2 (7.1) years; 
Mdnno ESS = 13.2 (15.4) years, U(30/ 39) = 269, p =.000). 
 
6. Discussion 
In the light of Williamson’s third attribute characterizing a transaction – the incur-
rence of durable transaction-specific investments – the question whether a superi-
ority of one governance form over another (as caused by the factor specificity of 
investments) exists was investigated. In this instance a relative advantageousness 
of hierarchical over a market form of organization in case of Sportshigh compared 
to Sportslow was expected. 
Both hypothesis could not be rejected, meaning that there does not seem to exist a 
superiority of one governance form over another (as caused by the factor specific-
ity of investments for the production of sporting success at both levels). These 
results seem to be contradictory to those of elatau and Emrich (2011, 2013). 
However, when inspecting the results in more detail it can be seen that they ap-
pear to be caused by “pre-conditions” related to producing sporting success in 
Austria and therefore the results are not directly comparable to those of the men-
tioned authors. 
As mentioned above Emrich et al. (2012) and elatau and Emrich (2013) suggest 
that factors like geographical conditions (= site specificity) and the strong influ-
ence of GDP per capita reflecting a strong dependence of specific and costly 
sports facilities might explain why the explanatory power of the regression equa-
tions used is lower for Winter Olympics compared to those of Summer Olympics. 
Considering that Austria has on one hand a relatively high GDP per capita as well 
as “good” climate and geographical conditions for winter sports (belonging to 
Sportshigh) but on the other hand a very low population, Austria’s “pre-conditions” 
seem to be relatively in favor of producing sporting success in Sportshigh rather 
than in Sportslow.19 In fact, none of the athletes was classified as successful at elite 
level and only two athletes were classified as successful at junior level in Sport-
slow. However, if the “pre-conditions” do not allow the production of success in 
Sportslow a relative comparison becomes senseless. In other words: for Sportslow it 
can be said that apparently it does not matter if the production process is organ-
ized in a hierarchical or market form – the “pre-conditions” seem not to allow an 
effective production anyway. 
                                                 
19 Compare on this Pitsch and Emrich (2008) and Maennig and Wellbrock (2008). 
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Therefore, all further analysis were concentrated on Sportshigh, were it could be 
seen that a more market-orientated form of organization seems to be (moderately) 
favorable for producing junior success. Interestingly enough, this is not true for 
elite level success, where a hierarchical form of production is no longer favorable. 
The further investigations of the data showed that there seem to exist two career 
paths to reach international success at elite level: eirst, what was called “early 
career athletes” – these athletes are characterized by an early start of training in 
sports clubs, an attendance to an ESS as well as by a successful participation at 
international competitions at junior level. Second, the “late career athletes”, start-
ing their career sig. later compared to the first group, without ESS attendance and 
without success at junior level. In the first group from 31 athletes 18 (58%) have 
gone this way (12 without junior success, 1 missing data), in the second group 
from 39 athletes 25 (64%) have used this path (6 with junior success, 8 missing 
data). This means that in Sportshigh the collective of successful elite athletes seems 
to consist of both – of athletes emerging from repeated procedures of selection 
and deselection (collectivistic approach) as well as of athletes early selected and 
running through a talent development process (individualistic). The finding of the 
second group of athletes is contrary to the overall findings of Güllich and Emrich 
(2012) and Güllich (2014). This might be caused by the fact that Austria is a 
smaller country geographically speaking compared to Germany or by the factor 
specificity of investments (dependency upon physical asset specificity and/or 
upon site specificity). Last but not least the difference in findings might originate 
in the Austrian sport system itself. A concentration of athletes in centralized per-
formance centers might limit alternative opportunities for involvement in high-
performance sports outside this socially constructed limits. Although the finding 
that athletes can become successful elite athletes outside the system speaks 
against this threat of social closing, it should be emphasized, that Sportshigh con-
sists of several sports – probably the social closer already exists for some of those. 
The finding that international success at junior and elite level significantly but in 
its magnitude only weakly to moderately correlate seems to be in line with the 
existing evidence. Therefore, international success at junior level should not be 
regarded as a necessary precondition or a guarantee for success in international 
competitions at elite level (e.g., Barth, 2015; Brouwers, De Bosscher, and 
Sotiriadou, 2012; Emrich and Güllich, 2005; Rees et al., 2016). Schumacher, 
Mroz, Mueller, Schmid, and Ruecker (2006) showed seemingly contradictory 
results, but their study’s data stem from cycling (part of Sportslow). The problem 
of using different sports in the studies is becoming apparent. 
There are several limitations of this study that need to be acknowledged. Apart 
from the five restrictions mentioned above (that the article addresses effectiveness 
not efficiency; that only two of Williamson’s five variables describing the factor 
specificity of investment, and by itself only one of three dimensions describing a 
transaction were used; analyses were only carried out for two forms of governance 
(market and hierarchy) and only for a certain form of governmental-hierarchical 
promotion of sporting success – the ESS; the equalization of two forms of ration-
ality is probably invalid), it has to be kept in mind that the data originates from a 
retrospective cross-sectional study. eurthermore, there is a clear limitation in how 
athletes were classified as successful. In this context we do not want to stress the 
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often brought forward argument– if only medals should count and should be used 
to determine success – but want to introduce another thought. Athletes are classi-
fied as successful as soon as they win a medal. The medal tables do not only count 
the athletes themselves once but every single medal they win. Therefore, the 
number of medals a single athlete wins should be considered more thoroughly in 
future works. Probably the two shown pathways of successful athletes lead to a 
different “probability of survival” at elite level which gives athletes the chance to 
win more medals than just one. 
Above all, the apparent preference in sports to further strengthen a hierarchical 
approach when it comes to the production of sporting success should be ques-
tioned. More precisely, the efforts of centralized institutions (i.e. in the case of 
Austria the so called ‘Olympiastützpunkte’ (Olympic Trainings Centers)), as well 
as their positive and negative impacts on elite and adult athletes, should be evalu-
ated and observed carefully. In a first step an analysis of the distribution of prop-
erty rights as well as a consideration of possible motivational problems on the 
basis of the principal-agent theory seem to be valuable and again underline the 
value of NIE in sport economics analysis. eurthermore, the found “loss of ad-
vance” at collective level from junior to elite level as well as the above mentioned 
problem of social closure should be investigated. 
erom a methodological point of view, qualitative parameters like variables in-
tended to catch a “nation’s sportive culture” should be incorporated, which further 
supports a need for more international studies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
On behalf of our results it can be said, that for countries like Austria it seems to be 
necessary to concentrate their efforts in the production of sporting success on 
Sportshigh. This bears two consequences: eirst, the applied classification seems to 
be useful in the context of sports promotion and second, “pre-conditions” influ-
encing the production of international elite level sporting success have to be con-
sidered, when trying to evaluate the relative effectiveness and efficiency of a na-
tion’s national sport governing bodies. 
eurthermore, it could be shown (even) for Sportshigh that concerning their effec-
tiveness, that apparently there exists no superiority of one form of organization 
over the other. Considering the (possible) additional costs on the collective as well 
as on the individual athlete’s level in case of a (more) hierarchical form of orga-
nizing the production of sporting success should question the observable efforts of 
further institutional centralization. It has to be concluded that in a hybrid form of 
organization like in Austria where the centralization might have exceeded the op-
timal extend, the congruency of different products is overemphasized. Therefore, 
new forms of decentralized cooperation have to be found, which should not at 
least be based on the idea of an absent congruence of individual aims of members 
being part of the production network. 
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